Semiconductor capacity planning is a cross-functional decision that requires coordination between the marketing and manufacturing divisions. We examine the main issues of a decentralized coordination scheme in a setting observed at a major US semiconductor manufacturer: marketing managers reserve capacity from manufacturing based on product demands, while attempting to maximize profit; manufacturing managers allocate capacity to competing marketing managers so as to minimize operating costs while ensuring efficient resource utilization. This cross-functional planning problem has two important characteristics: (i) both demands and capacity are subject to uncertainty; and (ii) all decision entities own private information while being self-interested. To study the issues of coordination we first formulate the local marketing and the manufacturing decision problem as separate stochastic programs. We then formulate a centralized stochastic programming model (JCA), which maximizes the firm's overall profit. JCA establishes a theoretical benchmark for performance, but is only achievable when all planning information is public. If local decision entities are to keep their planning information private, we submit that the best achievable coordination corresponds to an alternative stochastic model (DCA). We analyze the relationship and the theoretical gap between (JCA) and (DCA), thereby establishing the price of decentralization. Next, we examine two mechanisms that coordinate the marketing and manufacturing decisions to achieve (DCA) using different degrees of information exchange. Using insights from the Auxiliary Problem Principle (APP), we show that under both coordination mechanisms the divisional proposals converge to the global optimal solution of (DCA). We illustrate the theoretic insights using numerical examples as well as a real world case.
Introduction
Production capacity is the most significant portion of capital investment in semiconductor wafer manufacturing. Effective utilization and management of production capacity have significant implications to the profitability of the operation. Capacity planning in the industry typically entails strategic, and operational planning organized in a hierarchical manner. Strategic planning decisions specify which microelectronics technology at what capacity level within what timeframe is needed to meet expected future demands, and which fabrication (fab) facilities should be equipped and certified to produce with which technologies (Karabuk and Wu, 1999) .
Given the strategic fab configuration, operational planning specifies, in a short-term and dynamic basis, the actual number of "wafer starts" of a particular technology at each facility. In this paper, we will focus our attention on the operations planning aspects of capacity management, which is known in the industry as the capacity allocation problem. Capacity allocation typically involves multiple fab facilities of the firm, each with dif-0740-817X © 2002 "liE" ferent manufacturing capabilities, as well as yields, costs, lead-times, and quality expectations. A typical planning period is I week, while the overall planning horizon covers several weeks.
Manufacturing of microelectronics products consists of silicon wafer production (known as the "front-end" operations), followed by assembly, testing and packaging (the "back-end" operations). Front-end operations consist of the most crucial part of the process as it has a long manufacturing cycle time, and it represents the most significant portion of the capital investments. The overall manufacturing cycle time is typically in the range of 20-40 days, about 15-35 of which is spent in the wafer fab.
Back-end operations such as packaging, assembly and test, are typically carried out in geographically separated facilities (many are overseas), whose operations are typically not the bottleneck in the production cycle. This research is based on decision problems within a global capacity planning group at a major US semiconductor manufacturer. Our focus will be on the allocation of front-end manufacturing capacity across multiple wafer fabs around the globe. Although there are a great variety of end products (over 2000), they are categorized by ag-gregated technology families distinguished by the underlying manufacturing processes, and the equipment requirements. All capacity allocation decisions are based on aggregate technologies rather than end products.
One important characteristic of semiconductor capacity planning is the uncertainty in both demands and capacity. Demand uncertainty is due to the volatile nature of high-tech industries such as telecommunications, computers, and electronics. A microelectronics chip which faces high demand today may be quickly outdated in a few months with the introduction of a next-generation chip that requires upgraded technology. Uncertainty is even more pronounced in the short-term. Customers may change their orders frequently and significantly; for some the fluctuation of order quantity (of a certain future week) could average as much as 100% over the history of the order. Worse, customers may only eommunicate their demand profile over a short period into the future. Due to the long production lead-time, manufacturers must expand their "order view" by forecasting demand beyond what their customers would provide. On the other hand, capacity uncertainty is a fact of life in the industry due to the needs to continually upgrade fab facilities. New manufacturing processes introduce high variability in production yields and consequently cause uncertainty on manufacturing throughput. On the other hand, in order to achieve economies of scale, large production batches arc commonplace. This means that extreme outcomes in a particular demand and capacity realization can lead to long-lasting business consequences difficult to recover from. It is imperative for planners to consider uncertainties explicitly and strategically so as to hedge operational decisions against extreme outcomes.
Another industry reality of the capacity allocation problem is that demands and capacities are typically managed by different decision entities in the semiconductor firm. It is common practice in the industry to delegate these capital-intensive decisions to different divisions in order to establish proper checks and balances, and to maintain accountability. This could also ease the complexity of information gathering, processing, and decision-making. In our case, Product Managers (PMs) in different SBU's (Strategic Business Units) manage demands, serving marketing and customer relation functions, while Manufacturing Managers (MMs) at each fab facility manage capacity, ensuring its efficient utilization. Thus, not only are demand and capacity both exogenous sources of uncertainty, they are also endogenous factors within the firm due to different perspectives in the managcment structure. Product managers represent the marketing perspective where customer satisfaction and revenue maximization are the main goals. Manufacturing managers represent the perspective where the efficient utilization of resources, and the reduction in operating cost are the main goals. Besides the reward structure, also important is where do the insights and the information Karabuk and Wu required for reliable decisions exist. Product managers have the expertise and often the information concerning the behaviors of their customers, who might be able to anticipate possible changes in demand. PMs also have upto-date information about market trends, and they could sometimes predict a softening or strengthening market for some products. Similarly, manufacturing managers could make use of their experience about the equipment, the yields, and the loading status of production to adjust capacity allocation. Nonetheless, the marketing and manufacturing perspectives are often in conflict, which need to be reconciled and coordinated in order to maximize the overall efficiency of capacity usage. However, the centralized planning process in modern Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems has difficulty incorporating local information, let alone accommodating local perspectives. The main reason for this is that much valuable local information is privately held by managers motivated to leverage the information for local benefits. In this paper, we will explore insights required for a decentralized coordination mechanism, which allow PMs and MMs to reconcile their local interests with global efficiency. In the following, we first summarize the main literature and previous work related to the research.
Related literature
We will characterize uncertainty and coordination in the above decision environment using structural insights from a stochastic programming model with recourse. In the broader literature of stochastic programming for capacity and production planning problems we point to a few representative and relevant studies in the following. Bienstock and Shapiro (1988) model resource acquisition decisions as a stochastic program with recourse. They apply the model at an electric utility to make fuel contracting and plant construction decisions under demand uncertainty. In a frequently cited study, Eppen et al. (1989) model the capacity-planning problem of a major automobile manufacturer. Their model makes facilities configuration decisions for the production of different automotive models, and at the same time making shutdown decisions for some of the product lines. Demand over the medium-term planning period is treated as random. Berman et al. (1994) propose a stochastic programming model for the capacity expansion problem in a service industry with uncertain demand. Their model decides the size, location, and timing of the expansions so as to maximize the total expected profit. Escudero et al. (1993) summarize different stochastic programming models for the production and capacity planning problem. The decisions considered are production volume, product inventory, and resource acquisition decisions under uncertain demand. Power generation planning is another problem that has been modeled by various sto-chastic programming models (Takriti et al., 1996) . In all these applications, demand is the major source of uncertainty. Porteus and Whang (1991) and Kouvelis and Lariviere (2000) also examine internal market mechanisms for manufacturing capacity where incentive schemes are developed to induce system-optimal actions from marketing and manufacturing. However, their coordination is assumed at a more aggregate level where the decisionmaker's decision could be described by strictly convex, functional optimization problems. The coordination scheme is developed based on transfer payments derived a priori from the closed-form solution of the decision problem. Our analysis considers more detailed coordination under various demand and capacity scenarios in a mathematical programming setting.
Coordinating divisions in a multi-divisional firm by means of mathematical decomposition has been a subject for earlier OR research (Dantzig and Wolfe, 1961; Kate, 1972; Christensen and Obel, 1978; Burton and abel, 1980; Luna, 1984) . The most commonly used approach is to apply either Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition or Lagrangian relaxation to facilitate coordination. The problem is solved iteratively by alternatively solving for the relaxed problem (i.e., subproblems) and adjusting the prices (solve a master problem as in Dantzig-Wolfe or a subgradient search as in Lagrangian relaxation) until the optimal price vector is found and hence the original problem is solved. The economical interpretation of this solution process is that, a coordinator 'assigns prices on the common resources and decision-makers solve their local problem with the given prices and submit proposals. After the prices are adjusted to bring demand and supply closer, the same decision-making process continues in an iterative manner. However, there is a serious shortcoming in this~ppr~ach in that competitive equilibrium cannot be reached at the end of the iterations. That is, after the prices are finalized and the solution is found, the participants have incentives to trade in an after market and actually implement a different solution than the one found by coordination. There are a few studies that address this limitation. Jennergren (1972) proposed a modification to Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition, which perturbs the objective functions of the subproblems by a quadratic term. Jose et al. (1997) provide an in-depth analysis of the issue and generalize Jennergren's work in the context of auctions. Ertogral and Wu (1999) study a similar coordination mechanism in the context of production planning in the supply chain. They design an auction-theoretic mechanism for multiple production facilities using insights from Lagrangian decomposition. Kutanoglu and Wu (1999) show that Lagrangian relaxation, as a means of price coordination is a version of Walrasian auction tiitonnement that lead to non-zero duality gap for non-convex optimization problems. To eliminate the duality gap Walrasian tatoonnement could 745 be generalized to augmented tatoonnement using nonlinear pricing.
The semiconductor capacity allocation problem
The semiconductor capacity allocation problem is a combination of marketing and manufacturing problems. The Product Managers (PMs) and Manufacturing Managers (MMs) are key decision entities representing the interests of the marketing and manufacturing divisions, respectively. PM, are each responsible for a subset of product demands typically defined by customers from a specific market sector (e.g., telecommunications, multimedia devices, disk drives). Each PM must satisfy his/her customers on one hand while competing for (scarce) production capacity on the other. Their performance evaluation is mainly based on the total sales achieved; hence, they aim to meet all the anticipated demand throughout the planning period. MMs are each responsible for a subset of production capacity typically defined by fab facilities with a specific generation of production technology (defined by line-width, wafer size, etc.). Each MM must accommodate the requests from the PMs while ensuring the efficient utilization of his/her facility. Performance evaluation of the MMs is mainly based on operational costs, which drives their capacity allocation decisions. While the PMs and MMs typically have their own decision problems clearly defined, the collection of these decisions could be far from maximizing overall corporate profits. It is imperative to establish coordinated marketing-manufacturing solutions while preserving the decentralized organizational and information structure defined by the PMs and MMs. To explore such coordination scheme, in the following, we will further detail the decision problems faced by the PMs and MMs and develop two stochastic decision models from their points of view. We will then introduce the notion of coordination in this context and suggest methods that reconcile the two perspectives using insights from the Augmented Lagrangian.
The marketing problem
Let Xijt denote the amount of wafer supply that the PMs request for technology i (i E M) from facility j UE F) during planning period t (t E T). Although we do not explicitly include lead-times in the formulation, we interpret the planning periods as (t + lead-time). Define g (.) as the profit function (as perceived by the PM) associated with allocation x. Our observations at the semiconductor manufacturer indicate that demands for a technology can be fairly accurately represented by a Normal distribution. We capture this uncertainty in the form of discrete demand scenarios derived from these distributions and represented by set S\. However, the scenario representa-tion does not rely on a particular distribution for uncertain parameters. Let p, be the probability associated with .I' E SI. Each scenario s E SI corresponds to a demand vector d, = {d il.,., ViE M, t E T} that covers all technologies over all periods. Under a particular demand scenario .1', it may be the case where the requested production capacity is not sufficient to cover the realized demand. In this case, there are two recourse actions that could take place: make use of inventory Ius> carried from an earlier period, or outsource capacity Oils from a contracted outside foundry with additional cost. In the cases where outsourcing is not possible, the outsourcing costs can be interpreted as the costs of lost demands. Backordering is usually not an option in this environment due to high demand volatility and short product lifecycle. The basic decision problem for the PM can be stated as a multistage stochastic program. This model has block separable recourse (Louveaux, 1986) and therefore it can be posed as a two-stage stochastic program as follows, where Xijt is the first-stage decision variable while lits and Oits are the second-stage recourse variables. The demand uncertainty known to a PM is characterized by scenario set SI.
The Marketing Problem
The first-stage objective is to maximize the PM's utility.
With cil' c~denoting the unit costs associated with the variable in the superscript, the second-stage problem is to minimize the expected inventory and outsourcing costs over the planning periods. Constraints (2) state that demands must be satisfied by either first-stage capacity requisition, or by recourse actions via inventory positioning, or outsourcing.
The manufacturing problem
An MM allocates capacity at the wafer fab by determining the quantity of wafers to be released into the system to meet demands at the end of the manufacturing period. Thus, capacity allocation is measured in terms of wafer starts. Released wafer lots typically experience cycle time variability throughout the manufacturing period, every lot yields an uncertain amount of microelectronic
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chips at the end of the process. Thus, the number of wafer starts is determined based on the planned number of wafers at the end of the process; the actual quantity can be lower or higher than the planned wafer output. Our observation is that the yields are usually normally distributed around that of the planned output value. Therefore, we express this as capacity uncertainty' characterized by normally distributed random variables. The variance of this distribution is expressed as a fraction of the expected yield and is known to the MM. . Let Yij, denote the quantity of wafer starts for technology i(i E M) at facility JU E F) during planning period t(t E T). We represent capacity uncertainty by scenarios set Sz. Each scenario s E S: corresponds to a yield vector Ys = {kijsYijl, ViE M, V J E F, t E T} that covers all facilities, technologies and periods. Parameter kijs is the yield coefficient associated with technology i at facility J in scenario s. Thus, the term kijsYijl corresponds to the realized production for technology J under scenario s given the planned quantity Yijl' Note that we use the term "yield" in a broad sense referring to the actual production quantity at the end of the manufacturing cycle. From the viewpoint of the MMs, the PMs are customers who specify their capacity requests (in wafer starts) as Xijt. The MMs make their wafer start decisions based on this request and are liable for the consequences should there be deviations between the actual and the requested amount. Denote b-, b+ the recourse variables that measure for the yield deviations from the PM requests with underage and overage costs, c~and c~, respectively. Equipment constitutes the most significant capital investment in semiconductor manufacturing. Utilization of existing capacity either beyond or below a manufacturing target level U is both undesirable. When facilities operate beyond a certain utilization level, throughput may drop significantly due to increased equipment failures and congestion in the system. When the converse is true, it would be hard to justify the return on investment. It is common in the industry to set the target at as high as 90%. For further discussion of the utilization target, see Karabuk and Wu (1999) .
We now state a two-stage stochastic program that has block separable recourse for the MM's decision problem as follows, where the capacity uncertainty known to a MM is characterized by scenario set Sz.
The first-stage objective is to minimize the MM's operating costs as defined by the variable production cost, cij, and the capacity over/under utilization cost eX. Let aij be the capacity consumption rate for technology i at facility i. and ejt be the total capacity at facility j during period t.
The second term in the objective defines a quadratic penalty for violation of the capacity utilization target at both under and over utilization levels. The second-stage objective is defined by the underage or overage adjustments from the PM request under each senario s E S2. Constraints (3) measure the deviations of actual production quantities from the planned quantities (by (5-, (5+) under each yield scenario. The total capacity constraints for each facility in each period are stated in (4). To ensure operational stability, facility j may set forth restrictions that limit the maximal proportion of capacity (gi) that could be allocated to a particular technology i. This is expressed by constraints (5).
Consider a joint (PM-MM) optimization problem as a two-stage stochastic program as follows.
Coordinating marketing and manufacturing decisions (3)
With the marketing and manufacturing local problems defined, we will now explore the issue of coordination. First, it should be clear that without coordination the (PM) and (MM) local decisions are unlikely to achieve agreement (i.e., the capacity allocation Xijt i Yijl for some i.j, t) and second, these local decisions may be far from optimizing overall corporate profits. In the following, we first establish a theoretical target for coordination.
3.I. The theoretical target of coordination
To establish a goal for the coordination of marketing and manufacturing decisions, we envision e joint optimization model of the (PM-MM) local problems with the following requirements: (i) the demand and capacity scenarios considered by (PM) and (MM) respectively must be evaluated jointly; (ii) the objective function must be a convex function of the local problems; and (iii) local decisions from both sides must agree with each other. Note that, while formulating such a joint model may not be meaningful with respect to the organizational and information structure of the real problem, it is useful to consider this conceptual model as a step towards strategizing a coordination scheme between the PMs and MMs.
The joint capacity allocation can be viewed as a centrally coordinated marketing and manufacturing decision problem that combines PM's and MM's original problems in a stochastic programming model with recourse. However, the recourse in this problem (defined by (I"), and (2"), (3» uses joint demand-capacity scenarios SI x Sz opposed to the decomposed scenario structure S, and Si in the local problems. Constraints (6) ensure that the marketing and manufacturing decisions agree with each other.
To define a coordination mechanism that could be implemented in realistic marketing and manufacturing interfaces, we require that the mechanism should not require decision-makers to reveal private information. More specifically, we require the coordination mechanism to solve the capacity allocation problem in a decentralized manner using the (PM) and (MM) subproblems, which requires decentralized decision authority and local scenario information. Within the (lCA) model, the manufacturing subproblem can be viewed as a two-stage stochastic programming model with recourse, where x are stage 1 decisions subject to stage I constraints (4) and (5), and (5, (5+, 1, 0, yare recourse variables subject to recourse constraints (2"), (3) and (6). The market-ing subproblem can be described in a similar fashion. Nevertheless, this decomposition of the marketing and manufacturing problems requires the sharing of private information: the manufacturing problem must have access to true demand scenarios, and similarly the marketing problem must have access to true yield scenarios. Therefore, (lCA) docs not satisfy the basic requirements for a coordination mechanism, further, it may not be computationally feasible to deal with scenario set 8, x 82. To design a coordination mechanism that operates within a decentralized marketing and manufacturing structure while achieving results approximate that of (lCA), we define a Decentralized Capacity Allocation (DCA) problem as a straightforward combination of the marketing and manufacturing local problems as follows:
The main difference between (lCA) and (DCA) comes from the assumption on information availability: the former assumes that a centralized decision entity has full information on both demand and yield scenarios, and is in a position to evaluate all possible combinations of these scenarios (i.e., 8, x 82)' The later assumes that full information is not available to anyone entity, and the local scenario sets 81 and 82 must be evaluated separately and independently, This is reflected by the difference between constraint sets (2) and (2"). In fact, the recourse represented by (2) fix the yield scenario for all demand scenarios considered, i.e., set kijs = I ViE M, j E F, s E 8 1 • The gap between the solutions of the (DCA) and (lCA), as characterized by Propositions I to 4 in the following section, should be considered the price for decentralization in decision-making. ( lCA) (lCA) establishes the theoretical goal for coordination while (DCA) represents an achievable goal when information privacy is required. In the following, we establish main analytical relationships between (lCA) and (DCA). (iCA(.) recourse is optimized using the full distribution of the random variable (capacity yield). Then the proposition follows from Jensen's inequality (Kall and Wallace, 1994) and the function QDCA (x, k, = I, d,') bounds the other from below.
Tile Relationship between (DCA) and
• Proposition I states that the recourse in model (DCA) approximates the recourse of the (lCA) from below. Consequently, the capacity allocation solution of the (DCA) model constitutes an upper bound for the (lCA) model. In the following, we will provide some insights on the gap between the recourse functions (!JCA(.) and (iCA(.) by characterizing dual prices of the recourse constraints, and by the problem structure specific to capacity allocation. 
where 7C corresponds to the dual prices associated with the constraint set indicated by the superscript.
Proof.· For any given capacity allocation solution x, the recourse of (lCA) model can be expressed in terms of dual prices as follows (by duality theorem):
Similarly, the recourse of the (DCA) model can be expressed as follows: 
lit-Is
This increases the objective function value -'JCA by cpr, i.e.
nit's = c~. Similarly When I1d its is negative, there is excess inventory and decreasing the right-hand side by one unit causes one unit of extra inventory I its to be carried until it is used to compensate for one unit of shortage at a future period. If 1" is the first period after I' at which I1d it"s is positive, this incurs an inventory cost of (L;:t' cit), thus we have
Proposition 2 relates the gap between recourses QDCA(.) and Q'CA(.) to the dual prices and shows that the size of the gap depends on the differences between the dual price vectors for constraint sets (2) and (2"), and the supplydemand gap. Proposition 3 further shows that the dual prices are determined by the capacity shortages or overages under each joint scenario s E 51 X 52. In the following, we state a sufficient condition where the gap can be completely closed. This later situation will also strengthen the approximation of the QDCA(.). Another observation is that, as the unit inventory holding and outsourcing costs increase, the differences in dual prices increases, thus the gap G(.) also increases. Similarly, as the variability of demand scenarios and the yield scenarios increase, the magnitude of dual price differences across yield scenarios will increase, therefore the gap G(.) will increase. From the propositions, one could conclude that in the situations where demand and capacity scenarios are independent, when the cost of demand-capacity mismatching is low, or when the variation on demand and capacity is low, the approximation gap is expected to be smal1. With this established, we now describe coordination mechanisms designed to achieve the optimal solution defined by (DCA) while satisfying the information privacy requirements. As stated previously, the gap between (lCA) and (DCA) should be viewed as the price of coordination. From the above propositions, one could conclude that the size of the gap is determined by the dependency between demand and capacity scenarios, the marginal costs of demand-capacity mis-matching, and the variation on demand and capacity scenarios. In the following, we will describe coordination mechanisms designed to achieve the optimal solution defined by (DCA).
Coordination mechanism for the marketing and manufacturing problems
The coordination problem between manufacturing and marketing divisions can be interpreted as finding a set of transfer pricing between the buyers, PMs, and the sellers, MMs, in an internal market where manufacturing capacity is the economical commodity. In the decisionmaking framework we propose, the headquarters (i.e., central authority) sets generic rules regarding the rights and obligations of the participants and endows the divi-sions with complete control over how much to trade at what quantities. The negotiations (iterations) terminate when the division managers mutually agree on a fixed price quantity transaction. This is a commonly used approach in the accounting and applied economics literaturc to facilitate coordination between divisions of a firm such as marketing and manufacturing. The transfer prices that will coordinate the capacity allocation problem should have the property that both PMs and MMs solve their local problems and come up with the same solution which also solves the capacity allocation problem (DCA) optimally. Otherwise, the solution will not be supported by the local decision-makers and will likely to be altered during execution. In the following we present two coordination mechanisms using the notion of transfer pricing as a means to achieving coordination that corresponds to the system optimal. Both mechanisms are motivated by mathematical decomposition via Augmented Lagrangian.
Recall that Xijt denote the amount of wafer supply that the PMs request and Yijl the wafer supply quantity offered by the M Ms. We say that the coordination is consistent when wafer supply proposals from PMs (xijt) and MMs (Yijt) agree, that is xijt = Yijt for all technology i, facility j and planning period t, We say that the coordination achieves proactive equilibrium when the wafer supply proposal is consistent and the proposal corresponds to an optimal solution to the decentralized optimization problem (DCA). Since neither (PM) nor (MM) have closed form solutions, we will not be able to establish the transfer pricing a priori. Instead, we propose a coordination mechanism between (PM) and (MM) that would iteratively determine the transfer pricing using earlier information communicated by the other side. The procedure stops when the (PM) and (M M) solutions converge and become consistent with one another. Importantly, when a proper transfer pricing is found at convergence, the coordinated solution will correspond to the optimal of (DCA).
Finding a proper form of transfer pricing is a nontrivial task. Jennergren (1972) proposes a quadratic perturbation scheme for the subproblem objectives, which.
can be viewed as a randomized .search .9( the optim:M transfer pricing. A more systematic approach that could be applied to our problem at hand is'Rnown as the A ugmented Lagrangian Theory (Cohen and Zhu, 1984) . Augmented Lagrangian can be viewed as an enhancement of the "ordinary" Lagrangian using non-linear penalty methods. For non-convex problems, it is possible to completely close the duality gap that ordinary Lagrangian suffers. For convex but not strongly convex problems, the ordinary Lagrangian method may suffer from poor convergence due to non-unique subproblem optimal solutions. The Augmented Lagrangian improves convergcnce by essentially making the problem strongly convex. The Augmented Lagrangian can be solved by generic multiplier updating methods, which has better reported numerical stability than dual ascent approaches. Despite
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these advantages there has been little work using Augmented Lagrangian techniques in mathematical decomposition algorithms. The main reason for this is that the Augmented Lagrangian introduces coupling through the cost function, destroying its separability. Therefore, special consideration is necessary when using Augmented Lagrangian for decomposition. There are several methods in the literature each of which depend on building a linear approximation of the Augmented Lagrangian function at each iteration. Ruszczynski (1989) combines the method with ideas from Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition and develops a decomposition algorithm with strong convergence properties. Mulvey and Ruszczynski (1995) develop a decomposition algorithm called Diagonal Quadratic Approximation (DQA) for solving large-scale stochastic programming problems making use of the Augmented Lagrangian theory. Ruszczynski (1995) further explores analytical properties for the DQA method.
The Auxiliary Problem Principle (APP) (Cohen, 1978; Cohen and Zhu, 1984; Culioli and Cohen, 1990; Cohen and Miara, 1990; Zhu and Marcotte, 1995) offers an elegant solution to the above problem. In the APP framework, an auxiliary function is introduced to the objective function while the coupling term is linearized. It has been shown that the problem formed with this auxiliary function can be solved by the multipliers method and the solution converges to the optimal of the original (non-separable) problem. Carpentier et al. (1996) applied this result to solve the stochastic unit commitment problem using an Augmented Lagrangian approach. By the introduction of an auxiliary functional the APP provides an opportunity to tailor problem specific decomposition algorithms.
The coordination mechanisms
We now define a coordination scheme taking advantage of desirable properties of APP using the following construct:
Step 1. Consider the Marketing decision problem «PM) == min{zPM (x)Ix E X}), the Manufacturing decision . pfoble)11 «MM) == min{zMM(Y)ly E Y}), and the coordination problem «DCA) == min{zDcA(z)1
where If' is the set of constraints defined by scenarios set (S] + S2). It is the goal ofthe coordination mechanism to define modified problems (PM') and (MM') such that their corresponding decisions are consistent, i.e., x = Y, and optimal, i.e., zPM(x) = zMM(Y) = zOCA (x = y).
Iterate:
Step 2. Define an auxiliary function K(.) that measures the difference between the kth proposal by (PM) and the (k -I)th proposal by (MM), and vice versa.
Step 3. Based on the auxiliary junction, incorporate an Augmented Lagrangian function for the kth iteration of problem (PM) and (MM) that would solve the Augmented Lagrangian for the joint problem (DCA).
(Note: We will show in Proposition 5 that properly defined auxiliary function and Augmented Lagrangian term for the (PM), (MM) problems lead to convergence toward the optimum of (DCA». Using the above construct, we will define two coordination mechanisms assuming two different levels of information requirement. Define demand gap as the difference between demand and supply at iteration k: of the communication between marketing and manufacturing, i.e., J~, = x1j1 -yt" V i, j, t. A positive demand gap indicates shortage, whereas a negative demand gap measures the surplus at iteration k. Define Xyt, = 0, + x1 j l)/2 to be the average of the (PM) and (MM), and %' a system imposed price at the beginning of iteration k to facilitate coordination. Let s, p and c be scale constants. We now outline Coordination Mechanism I as follows:
laxed while the manufacturing and marketing subproblems are coordinated via non-linear prices which account for disagreement in their earlier quantity proposals. The total cost of the transfer (prices x quantities) at any iteration is added as a cost term to the marketing problem and as a revenue term to the manufacturing problem. What differentiates this algorithm from a classical dual decomposition is the additional quadratic terms which penalize the deviation of common decision variables from their average in the previous iteration and the linear penalty term which penalizes the demand gap. Both terms can be interpreted as the bargaining power of one party over to the other for decreasing the demand gap in their favor. The quadratic term Mechanism I reflects the assumption that the bargaining power of both sides are equal. The term could be modified to reflect an inbalanced bargaining power of the participants and the algorithm retains the same analytical properties. For example consider the following quadratic penalty terms. subject to Mechanism I is designed based on the principle of a price-based decomposition algorithm. The interconnecting decision variables between (PM) and (MM) are re-
If the proposals from (PM) and (MM) are consistent
The above terms would reflect a more influential manufacturing division that can induce the other side to make more sacrifice from their proposals to come to an agreement. The coordination mechanism allows managers of either sides to estimate the decisions of the other side using the information revealed in the previous iteration. This information can be a fixed (historic) value throughout the iterations, rather than a dynamic value that changes at every iteration and the analytical properties of the algorithm will be the same. This type of application would be more applicable when decision-makers have accurate and detailed historic information about each other before the negotiation starts. Note that the price update in Step 2 requires globally available information (i.e., the previous price set and the quantity proposals), which need to be tracked at a designated central location in a transparent way. Also note that the mechanism may terminate with some of the prices being negative, indicating that the capacity seller, MM, has to pay for them to the capacity buyer, PM. This is due to the fact that the MMs has a utilization target below which a penalty incurs in their local problem. Occasionally, it may be less costly for MM to produce more than the PMs' demands rather than operating at low capacity utilization.
Proposition S. Mechanism 1 solves an Augmented Lagrangian function of model (DCA). The sequence of (proposals, transfer prices) vectors is bounded and it converges to a saddle point of the associated Augmented Lagrangian function with the appropriate choice of scale parameters.
(8)
subject to xEX.
The Manufacturing Problem (MMs solve)

Minimize
Step 2. Update the transfer prices as follows:
Step 1. The PMs and MMs solve their corresponding decision problem using their own objective function along with the system-imposed transfer pricing:
The Marketing Problem (PMs solve) Percentage deviation (%) 0.14 0.16
In implementing both of the mechanisms, we set the augmented Lagrangian penalty parameter c to zero so as to simplify the comparison. The c parameter is designed lor non-convex objectives (Cohen and Zhu, 1984) . Since our example problem is linear quadratic, exclusion of the c parameter should not make significant difference. Pilot runs confirm this to be the case.
(Case I).' Mature products -when the capacity mee Is the total expected demand
We perform pilot runs on sample data to find the appropriute s and p values. Parameter p influences the rate at which the transfer prices are updated in each iteration, and parameter f. determines the weight of the quadratic penalty terms, which regulates the effects of the price updates and enhances convergence. For the numerical example at hand it turned out that p E (0, 1.0] coupled with 0 equal to lip ensures convergence. Any combination of (0, p) values obtained this way could be a good starting point for further experimentation in a general setting.
As a result of the pilot study, we use (f. = 10, P = 0.1) and (I: = 12, P = 0.1) for Mechanisms I and II respectively. Note the increase in 0 for Mechanism II essentially decreases the influence of the quadratic penalty term in the mechanism. This is because in Mechanism II the information communicated between the subproblems is set at a more aggrega te level, which red uces the overall inconsistency between the subproblem solutions, and the needs to regulate the priee updates. The mechanism stops when the Euclidian distance between the x = (Xijt) and y = (Yijt) vectors is below a threshold value of 16 (the number of common decision variables). This criterion in effect stops the mechanism when the average disagreement between any clement of x and y vectors is one unit. The value of decision variables (x, y) at the termination range between 200 and 700 resulting in an average of 0.5 and 0.14% disagreement in worst and best case, respectively.
When the mechanism terminates under this condition, we have two solutions (one from PMs and one from M Ms problem) that are very close to each other, but are not exactly equal. In order to generate a feasible solution for evaluation we applied the following: at the termination of the mechanism, we compute the average of the x and y vectors which is a feasible solution to the (DCA). These decisions are then fixed and the (DCA) model is solved (by adjusting the inventory I and outsourcing 0 levels) to compute the objective values of the mechanism. We also solved the (DCA) directly to optimality so that we can compare the feasible solution generated by the mechanisms to that of the optimal to (DCA). Table I summarizes the parameter settings and performance of the two algorithms. The last column indicates the percent deviation of the mechanisms' solution from the optimum that is obtained by solving (DCA) directly.
The results show that both mechanisms converge to within 0.2% of the optimal solution of model (DCA) and therefore the termination criterion appears to be satisfactory. In terms of performance, it takes Mechanism II a smaller number of iterations to converge compared to Mechanism I. This is somewhat surprising because Mechanism II uses information in an aggregated level compared Mechanism I. However, recall from the discussion in Section 3.3 that in the special case where the total expected demand is close to the capacity, the aggregated demand and supply information used in Mechanism II will be close to each other early on in the iterations. The example under Case I demonstrated this situation. Figure I shows the convergence plot of the two mechanisms. One important observation from the figure is that the gap between subproblem solutions reduces to a low level quite early (around 22 for Mechanism II, and 31 for Mechanism I) and improves very slowly after that. This suggests that a good heuristic solution could be obtained by terminating the iterations early. Table 2 summarizes the parameter settings and performance of the algorithms for Case 2. Similar to Case I both algorithms converge to the optimum. However, this time Mechanism I converges faster than Mechanism II. In Case 2 the degree of conflict between the subproblems is higher due to the excess demand and Mechanism I solves the problem effectively by using more aggressive parameter settings. Nevertheless, the performance of Mechanism" is quite close to that of Mechanism I and is certainly accepta ble. Figure 2 shows the distance between the subproblem solutions throughout the iterations. The magnitude of distance is higher in nearly every iteration as compared to Case I. This is due to increased degree of conflict in Case 2.
(Case 2).' New products -when the capacity is below the total expected demand
Case study of a real world semiconductor capacity aIlocation problem
We now apply the coordination mechanisms to a disguised real world data set obtained from a leading US .
• ---_._-_._-.
-------, -.. semiconductor manufacturer. The data set consists of anticipated demand and capacity data that covers a period of several months, of which we test the coordination mechanism over a period of 4 weeks. The data set contains completed demand and capacity scenarios over the planning horizon, as well as cost data such as the underage and overage penalty for production deviations, and the underutilization penalty. Due to a confidentiality agreement we are not able to present the actual data set, but we will discuss the characteristics of the data set as follows. Fifty-five aggregate technologies are considered for capacity planning. The firm has five semiconductor fabs located worldwide. Each time bucket for capacity allocation is I week over a planning horizon of I month. The expected total demand for the planning horizon is 10% above the total available capacity. The unit production cost for a technology can be different at different facilities due to managerial and physical factors such as tance between the x = (Xijt) and y = (Yij,) vectors is below a threshold value of 1100 (the number of common decision variables). This criterion is actually stricter than its application with the small example of the previous subsection. This time the value of decision variables at termination has a much higher magnitude and therefore the average disagreement percentage is much less than the percentages reported in Section 4.1.1. Table 3 summarizes the parameter settings and performance of the two algorithms. Figure 3 shows the convergence plots of the two mechanisms. As one would expect, Mechanism I converges faster than Mechanism II due to more detailed information it utilizes throughout the iterations. Mechanism II on the other hand requires only aggregated information to pass between the problems. In decisionthe age of the facility. The demand for produets using mature technologies is relatively steady and the manufacturing process has relatively little variability. On the other hand, products requiring new technologies are typically in the process of ramping up, which have highly volatile demand and highly variable yields (capacity). Included in the dataset are 20 demand scenarios and 20 capacity scenarios. Besides demand and capacity, the inventory carrying and outsourcing (or last sales) costs also depend on particular products and technologies. Products that are more commodity-like have relatively lower inventory carrying costs since excess production is more likely to sell in future periods. On the other hand, custom products made for specific customers are more sensitive to specification changes and excess production is likely to be scrapped, This result in a higher inventory carrying costs. Further, for custom products the firm maybe the only supplier for the customer and outsourcing may not be possible. Capacity shortage in these cases would result in loss of sales. On the other hand, there are products which demands are managed via consignment where the supplier owns and keeps track of the inventory at the customer's site. In such arrangements, there is usually a safety stock against possible shortages and shortage during a single period does not have immediate effect on the customer's production. Outsourcing cost in the later case would be relatively insignificant.
We apply Mechanism I and Mechanism II to the above data set, which would produce a solution corresponding to (DCA). However, due to the size of the problem, it is computationally infeasible to solve the theoretical benchmark, [he (lCA) model. For both of the mechanisms, we set the Augmented Lagrangian penalty parameter c to zero for the same reasons we stated in the previous section. making environments where both parties agree to supply the detailed formation that is needed by Mechanism I to each other, it should be the natural choice to facilitate coordination. On the other hand, in an environment where the decision-makers consider their detailed proposals private information and react only to prices announced by a mutually agreed mediator, Mechanism II may be the only applicable choice. In our example of the semiconductor manufacturer, it is most likely that both PMs and MMs would be more comfortable with only passing aggregate information during the iterations. In that case, it will not be possible to identify a single manager who performs poorly. However, this case study shows the potential improvements in the negotiation process if such detailed information is made available to the decision-makers.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the issues of decentralizing the capacity planning decision in the semiconductor industry.
Using the general framework of stochastic programming, we model the decision problem using the viewpoints of the marketing managers, the manufacturing managers, and the firm. We first show that decentralization requires the additional restriction of maintaining private information, which creates unavoidable degradation on overall performance. Under the private information assumption, we show that coordination is achievable between marketing and manufacturing using an information exchange scheme. We propose two coordination mechanisms using this scheme and prove that the mechanism will converge to the global solution as defined by model (DCA). From a mathematical standpoint, we modeled the information exchange as a non-linear component added to the local objective function of competing decision-makers. This component reflects the amount of information that one decision-maker has about the other side and regulates the local decisions to match to the other side more closely. We proved the convergence of this information exchange scheme using the Auxiliary Problem Principle (APP). The APP theory provides a flexible analytical framework to develop coordination mechanisms. The two mechanisms we developed in this study are only examples among a wide variety of possibilities. Finally, we demonstrate the working of the proposed mechanisms using generated numerical data and a real world data set. This research is one of the few studies that utilizes the application of the APP framework and the Augmented Lagrangian approach. It appears that future research is needed to apply this approach to both optimization and coordination problems that can be solved by mathematical composition. 
